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LAWYERS' JUSTICE 
William A. Edmundson* 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY. By David Luban. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xxix, 440. Cloth, 
$55; paper, $12.95. 
THE SOCIAL REsPONSIBILmES OF LA WYERS: CASE STUDIES. By 
Philip B. Heymann and Lance Liebman. Westbury, N.Y.: Founda-
tion Press 1988. Pp. xxvii, 354. Paper, $16. 
David Luban's1 thoroughgoing philosophical examination of legal 
ethics may well come to define many of the terms of debate on the 
subject, much as John Rawls' A Theory of Justice has defined the terms 
of debate in political theory in the years since its publication. The 
premise of the book - and certainly a correct one - is that "our 
nation is so dependent on its lawyers that their ethical problems trans-
form themselves into public difficulties" (p. xviii). Luban's effort to 
bring lawyers' ethics "before the 'tribunal of reason' itself" will no 
doubt add considerable impetus to the growing public conversation 
about law, lawyers, and justice. 
Luban focuses upon what he terms the "standard conception" of 
the lawyer's role. The standard conception is defined by two princi-
ples: a "principle of partisanship," which commits the lawyer to an 
"extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client"; and a "principle of 
non-accountability," according to which "the lawyer bears no respon-
sibility for the client's goals or the means used to attain them" (p. xx). 
The book has two broad aims. The first is to show that in civil matters 
the standard conception, and particularly its principle of nonac-
countability, is untenable from the viewpoint of "secular ethical 
thought" (p. xxvi). The second aim is to show that, with respect to 
civil as well as criminal matters, relatively powerless individuals have 
an implicit right under our principles of government to at least a mini-
mal level of legal services, underwritten by the state. The two aims 
could be summarized by saying that the first is to strip the powerful of 
overzealous advocacy in the civil arena, and the second is to guarantee 
zealous advocacy there to the powerless. 
• Assistant Professor, The University of Mississippi School of Law. B.A. 1972, Antioch 
College; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1982, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1985, Duke Univer-
sity. - Ed. I am indebted to Michael Hoffheimer, Monroe Freedman, Tim Hall, Ray Patterson, 
and Tom Morgan, for their helpful comments on an early draft of this review. 
I. David Luban is a Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and 
Professor of Law at the University of Maryland. 
1833 
1834 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1833 
Part I of the book presents Luban's challenge to the theoretical 
structure in which the standard conception is embedded. This struc-
ture forms what Luban terms the "dominant picture" of legal ethics, 
which consists of three elements: a theory of role morality akin to 
F.H. Bradley's ethical system; the "adversary system excuse" for fol-
lowing role morality rather than "common" morality where the two 
conflict; and the standard conception itself, which defines the lawyer's 
role (pp. xix-xx). Luban's challenge is motivated by the (widely 
shared) belief that the standard conception creates a professional role 
whose duties are often intolerably far removed from those of common 
morality. Luban's examples include these: 
- a lawyer "bends her talents and ingenuity toward getting a 
guilty, violent criminal back on the street" (p. xx); 
- a lawyer assists "a man convicted of incest to regain custody of 
his children" (p. xxii); 
-Annesley v. Anglesey, 2 in which a lawyer privately prosecutes a 
man at the bidding of a client, whose sole interest is that he stands to 
gain financially by the man's conviction (pp. 3-9, 14-15, 49-52); 
- Zabella v. Pakel 3 in which a lawyer enables a "wealthy man ... 
to evade a five thousand dollar debt to an 'old friend, countryman and 
former employee' by pleading the statute of limitations" (pp. 9-10, 47-
53, 82); 
- a lawyer presents perjured testimony on behalf of a criminal 
defendant and brutally discredits truthful opposing witnesses (p. xxi); 
-The "Lake Pleasant Bodies Case,"4 in which lawyers acting on 
their client's information locate and photograph the bodies of two 
murder victims, but do not disclose this information until much later 
(pp. 53-54, 149-53, 179, 185-86); 
- Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 5 in which a lawyer defending a per-
sonal injury suit learns that the plaintiff has a life-threatening aneu-
rysm, of which the plaintiff is unaware, and does not inform him (pp. 
149-53, 179, 203). 
In most of these examples, not only does the dominant picture put 
the lawyer at odds with ordinary morality, it also makes the lawyer an 
enemy of the law itself. Luban passionately, but cogently, rejects the 
realist suggestion that zealous advocacy shows law all the respect it is 
due (pp. 11-49), and cites the following as instances of lawyers work-
ing to frustrate the law by seeing to it that the party that legally should 
prevail does not: 
- lawyers for the D.C. Metro ar&uing that personal injury suits 
2. Annesley v. Anglesey, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743). 
3. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957). 
4. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), ajfd., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 
N.Y.S.2d 771, ajfd., 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976). 
5. 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962). 
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against the subway system could not proceed in a court created after 
the Metro's chartering, and that filing there did not toll the statute of 
limitations (pp. 13, 18, 49); 
- lawyers challenging Immigration and Naturalization Service 
detentions on the ground that the detention centers had been built 
without necessary environmental approvals (pp. 13-14); 
- forum-shopping (p. 14); 
- taking inconsistent positions (pp. 14-15). 
Luban diagnoses these symptoms as products of "instrumentalism 
run amok" (p. 13) and traces this condition to the prevailing client-
service ethic of the profession, derived from the standard conception. 
He argues that the standard conception and its client-centered ethic 
ought to be replaced with an ethic of "moral activism" (pp. xxii, 160-
61). The morally activist lawyer shares responsibility for the aims of 
the representation, challenges aims that are morally unworthy, and 
cares about means beyond their mere legality. When in disagreement 
with the client, Luban's lawyer "does not simply terminate the rela-
tionship, but tries to influence the client for the better" (p. 160), and 
even may - from the client's viewpoint - betray the client. 
Luban painstakingly exhibits the manner in which the standard 
conception relies for its justification upon appeals to the adversary sys-
tem and the roles it requires - this is the "adversary system excuse."6 
The adversary system excuse is but an instance of a general pattern of 
justification for role-motivated departures from common morality, 
which Luban somewhat infelicitously calls "the fourfold root of suffi-
cient reason" (pp. xxii, 129-39). Within the "fourfold root" pattern, 
the validity of an excuse is determined by how strongly the institution 
appealed to is itself justified. 
Before measuring the strength of the many justifications that have 
been offered for the adversary system, Luban distinguishes between a 
"civil paradigm" of adversary justice and a "criminal paradigm" (pp. 
58-66). For reasons that I will explore in some detail, he concentrates 
upon the possible justifications of the civil - rather than the criminal 
- paradigm of adversary justice. After analyzing a range of defenses 
of the morality of the (civil) adversary system - including consequen-
tialist arguments as well as a "human dignity" argument advanced by 
philosopher Alan Donagan7 - Luban concludes that it is at best 
weakly justified. Therefore, he argues, the civil adversary system, as 
an institution, cannot justify "any but the most insignificant deviations 
from common morality" (pp. 67-93, 154). Luban concludes that the 
6. Pp. xix-xx, 148-56. Luban's discussion here develops earlier thoughts that appeared in 
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LA WYER: LA WYERS' ROLE AND LAW-
YERS' ETHICS 83 (D. Luban ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]. 
7. Pp. 85-87 (citing Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE 
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 6, at 128-33). -
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principle of nonaccountability is untenable in the civil arena, and that 
the principle of partisanship is thus seriously constrained, "for ac-
countable lawyers can optimize client outcomes only within the limits 
of common moral obligations."8 
Thus, the principal result of the book's first part is a split-level 
standard of zeal - old-fashioned, standard zeal for criminal defense 
attorneys and attorneys for the little guy in "quasi-criminal" civil mat-
ters, and a "limited zeal" standard for lawyers for the state and for 
powerful institutions.9 But the overall argument itself depends upon 
the claim that the standard role of criminal defense attorneys is justi-
fied in a fashion that is inapplicable to the adversary system generally. 
To understand the structure of the argument, it is important to ex-
plore in detail Luban's reliance upon the distinction between civil and 
criminal representation. 
Luban's key claim is that while the "final cause" of the civil para-
digm is "legal justice," that of the "criminal defense paradigm" is "not 
legal justice but the protection of accused individuals against the state 
or, more generally, the preservation of the proper relation between 
powerful institutions and those over whom they are able to exercise 
their power" (p. 66). Therefore - and this is a crucial tum in Luban's 
overall argument - the evaluation of the adversary system as a system 
of justice must be focused upon the civil paradigm to the exclusion of 
the criminal paradigm, for it is only within the civil paradigm that the 
adversary system functions primarily as a system of justice, i.e., 'as a 
system primarily concerned with truth and desert. Luban distin-
guishes the "criminal" and "civil" paradigms this way: 
The criminal defense paradigm includes any litigation context in which 
zealous advocacy is justified by virtue of the fact that we have political 
reasons to aim at prophylactic protection from the state, even at the ex-
pense of justice. In the same way we can speak of a "civil suit para-
digm": this involves any litigation context in which, because we are 
confronted with a dispute between relatively evenly matched parties, our 
primary aim is legal justice, the assignment of rewards and remedies on 
the basis of the parties' behavior as prescribed by legal norms. [p. 63] 
8. P. 155. Luban embarks upon a "desperate and tedious safari,'' p. 145, to preserve a role 
for "role" morality, see pp. 128-47, and he even embraces the preservation of a role for roles as a 
criterion of his project's success, see p. 125; but in the end his view accords lawyers' role-bound 
considerations a vanishingly small weight. Compare pp. 146-47 (roles generally create "new pos-
sibilities of human acknowledgment,'' so that role-directed conduct - despite its variance from 
common moral demands - satisfies common morality's central demand that one act so as to 
acknowledge the humanity of others) with pp. 154-55 (the merely pragmatic justification for civil-
paradigm adversary system means that "when [legal] professional and moral obligations conflict, 
the moral obligation takes precedence"). 
9. Pp. 58-66, 156-58. A relaxed standard of zeal in civil litigation is similarly urged by Mur-
ray L. Schwartz. See Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 
543, 553-54; see also Zimmerman, Professional Standards Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's 
Dilemma, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5. 
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What supplies these "political reasons"? Luban identifies the source 
as "classical liberalism": 
a complex involving . . . the ideas that the state exists primarily to pro-
tect its citizens in the pursuit of their own goals and not to pursue goals 
of its own; that individuals have rights, natural or otherwise, against the 
state; and that the greatest danger to citizens is the state itself. [p. 63] 
Luban adverts that the first of these ideas holds "little appeal" while 
the second and third have been made plausible by "[t]he terrifying 
advent of totalitarian regimes in our century" (p. 63). Luban finds the 
political theory of classical liberalism "incomplete, if ... not actually 
false," however, for "[i]t neglects the fact that the state is not the only 
concentration of enormous power in modem society" (p. 63). To cor-
rect this deficiency, Luban recharacterizes the "criminal defense para-
digm" as 
any litigation context in which zealous advocacy on behalf of relatively 
weak clients is justified by the fact that we have political reasons to aim 
at prophylactic, or preemptive, overprotection of the individual from 
powerful institutions (including the state, but also including private insti-
tutions), even at the expense of justice. [p. 65] 
The "political reasons" underpinning the paradigm so redescribed are 
characterized as drawn from a "progressive correction of classical lib-
eralism" (p. 65). -
At this point I will interpose some worries about Luban's proce-
dure. His distinction of the two paradigms is overdrawn. It is an ex-
aggeration to suggest that justice is an only tangential purpose of 
criminal justice. It is of course true that criminal defendants enjoy 
special constitutional protections; but the constitutional right to coun-
sel does not obviously amount to an endorsement of the standard con-
ception of defense counsel's role. 10 And, while it is true that legal 
justice is a chief aim of the civil justice system, it is untrue to say that 
that is its only aim, or that it does not serve other important values as 
well. Civil suits avert civil warfare, and do a better job of that than of 
bringing heavenly justice to earth. To serve this peacekeeping func-
tion, each litigant must feel that her side was heard and that her cham-
pion was able to fight as fiercely to achieve her vindication as she 
would have fought herself, had she the training and inclination. If the 
civil justice system as we find it is - to use Luban's phrase - prophy-
lactically overprotective of each individual's rights against each other, 
it is at least arguably justified in being so because of "political rea-
sons" drawn from - where else? - classical liberalism. 
10. In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court opined that the sixth amendment 
right to "reasonably effective" assistance of counsel in a criminal defense is not automatically 
violated by a breach of an ethical standard. See 475 U.S. at 165. The Court distanced itself from 
approaches that would "narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amend-
ment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct." 475 
U.S. at 165; cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (criminal defendant assumed to have sixth 
amendment right to counsel free of actual conflicts of interest). 
1838 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1833 
Luban's rendering of classical (and progressively corrected classi-
cal) liberalism is incomplete. In it, the Hobbesian war of all against all 
is all but forgotten; but liberalism was born of suspicion of others and 
only with the passage of time has come to be (mis)understood as solely 
a doctrine of opposition to what Luban terms that "gaseous inverte-
brate," the state (pp. 31, 37). Liberals believe we have rights not only 
against the state, but also against others, and not only against strong 
others, but against all others. If - as Luban himself argues - there is 
a conceptual barrier to the existence of duties toward gaseous in-
vertebrates, then there is a conceptual barrier to the existence of rights 
against them as well. Thus, a properly tended liberal ontology will 
include rights against others, but no rights - except in a derivative 
and eliminable sense - against the state and institutions. 
A corrected understanding of the multiplicity of aims of the civil 
justice paradigm, and of their roots in classical liberalism, undermines 
Luban's overall argumentative strategy. The standard conception in 
both criminal and civil paradigms could, on classical liberal principles, 
be defended directly by appeal to "political reasons" rather than by 
the exacting route of weighing up the pros and cons of the adversary 
system, as the "fourfold root" would require. By invoking "political 
reasons," Luban in effec~ allows the criminal adversary system to side-
step the "fourfold root" and cut ahead in line, but he does not show 
why the civil paradigm does not deserve the benefit of these same 
political reasons (even less does he ask whether they are ethically 
sound). 
For purposes of removing the moral excesses of the system, Lu ban 
is aware that the standard conception could be trimmed all the way 
around the edges rather than cut into the two pieces represented by 
the split-level standard of limited civil zeal and fully zealous criminal 
defense. But he evidently believes that the most plausible view will not 
only be reformist but will also guarantee a "scorched earth defense" 
(p. 203) to the accused criminal. Of course, if the "split-level" stan-
dard of zeal is confirmed by its applications, then the strategy of treat-
ing the criminal and civil paradigms differently with regard to their 
respective justifications will seem more defensible. I will assess this 
possibility below. 
Although Luban does not put the criminal adversary paradigm to 
the "fourfold root" test, he does provide a rigorous defense of one 
aspect of the standard conception of criminal advocacy- the lawyer's 
duty to preserve confidences. Part II of the book (pp. 177-234) is a 
discussion of the duty and privilege of confidentiality, and here too 
Luban advocates a split-level ethical standard. Rejecting the possibil-
ity of a utilitarian defense, 11 Luban argues that the evidentiary privi-
lege for client confidences is, in the criminal defense context, justified 
11. Pp. 189-92. Luban is persuaded that there is no good utilitarian answer to the 
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by human dignity concerns.12 Human dignity requires that the crimi-
nally accused enjoy a privilege against self-incrimination, for without 
it the guilty would be cruelly tempted to commit perjury to escape 
punishment. 13 Respect for the human dignity of the accused also re-
quires a right to the effective assistance of counsel. And unless the 
accused can confide in counsel without fear of unwanted disclosure, 
she may be forced to trade away one right in order to exercise the 
other. Therefore, a decent regard for human dignity requires that the 
criminally accused be able to exercise the attorney I client privilege. 
The broader duty of confidentiality is justified, Luban argues, in order 
further to encourage the client's communication with counsel and to 
enable counsel to prepare, unhindered by any concern that what she 
learns might be turned against her client (pp. 201-02). 
Luban then turns to the question: Doesn't this or a similar ration-
ale justify the duty of confidentiality within the civil paradigm? His 
answer is no (pp. 202-04). He notes that there is discovery in civil 
cases, in which each party may be required to testify under oath as to 
all matters that might lead to evidence relevant to the dispute. In a 
criminal case, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
bars the state from engaging in any discovery of the defendant. This 
difference is not conclusive, as Luban points out, unless the moral 
grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination do not justify a civil 
counterpart (for which he suggests the term "privilege against self-
immolation" (p. 203)). Luban argues that they do not: 
The difference is this: the purpose of a criminal conviction is to punish 
wrongdoing, while the purpose of a civil action is to provide remedy [sic] 
to a victim . . . . The existence of the injured party expands our concern 
for human dignity from one person (the criminal defendant) to two (the 
defendant and the aggrieved plaintiff). And it is absurd, I believe, to 
argue that forcing the civil defendant to choose between lying and re-
vealing facts that indicate that she indeed owes compensation affronts 
her human dignity more than permitting her to preserve her honor by 
eluding a just judgment affronts the human dignity of her victim. For 
this is tantamount to saying that the victim's injury is less important 
than the injurer's honor. Similarly, to force upon the plaintiff the choice 
Benthamite argument that "[t]he privilege can do a guilty defendant no legitimate good, and 
abolishing it can do an innocent defendant no illegitimate harm .... " P. 190. 
12. Pp. 192-97. Luban's argument draws inspiration from M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETH-
ICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4-5 (1975). 
13. Luban elsewhere considers Donagan's argument that a concern for human dignity re-
quires a presumption that the defendant has a good-faith defense, and that therefore an advocate 
must be made available to the defendant to present that defense effectively. But, Luban claims, 
this requirement would be satisfied by an inquisitorial system, and therefore Donagan's concerns 
do not support the standard conception of the lawyer's role. Pp. 85-87, 193. A distinct concern 
to avoid exposing the defendant to the cruel temptation to perjure herself is what, for Luban, 
underlies the privilege against self-incrimination, and this concern evidently goes more deeply to 
the core. Donagan, in fact, does not agree that human dignity concerns require the privilege 
against self-incrimination, as Luban acknowledges. P. 195. 
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between lying and admitting facts that would show no compensation is 
owed her is scarcely the "form of torture more cruel than physical tor-
ture" that Memmius accused the oath de veritate dicenda of inflicting on 
accused heretics.14 
Luban falls here, I think, into several errors. I leave aside the over-
simplification of assigning a single, punitive purpose to criminal justice 
and a single, compensatory purpose to civil justice; but it is an egre-
gious error to suggest that no victim exists in criminal cases. Typi-
cally, there is a victim. Therefore, the inquiry in both the civil and the 
criminal case ought to be the same, whatever it is. If Luban has cor-
rectly identified the proper inquiry as that of deciding whose dignity 
would suffer more, the wrongdoer's (should he be forced to testify) or 
the victim's (should she unjustly fail to be vindicated), answering 
seems to call for some sort of comparison of the dignitary losses 
involved. 
In a criminal case - say, a rape - the wrongdoer has a stake in 
avoiding the dignitary injury that a "Memmian choice" would occa-
sion.15 What the victim has at stake is her sense of personal worth, her 
peace of mind, and, often, her reputation as well. I think it is false to 
suggest - as Luban does - that "no one's life is made materially 
worse off by an acquittal as such" (p. 59), unless the adverb is meant 
quite literally. I think most of us would have to swallow very hard to 
accept the suggestion implicit in Luban's analysis, that in upholding 
the privilege against self-incrimination we are judging that the victim's 
injury is less important than the rapist's honor. 
The implication about balancing the dignitary injuries is one that 
Luban has now disavowed.16 But it would not do to leave the victim 
out of it and rest upon the point that lying to avoid losing one's liberty 
is more tempting - and thus occasions a deeper torment and a greater 
dignitary affront to the accused - than lying to avoid losing money. 
Elsewhere in the book Luban casts doubt on such a reading, as he also 
14. Pp. 203-04. Luban continues: "In matters of distributive justice between private parties, 
moreover, the Memmian dilemma does not signal the utter subordination of self to state: it 
signals only the momentary 'subordination' of injurer to victim for purposes of making the victim 
whole." P. 204. Luban skates here over a number of stubborn facts. The victim is the party that 
typically is the first and least "momentarily" subordinated in civil discovery. Moreover, a civil 
litigant's "subordination" occurs within a framework created and maintained by the state, and is 
ultimately backed by the threat of state-enforced sanctions, which may include incarceration for 
contempt. And so on. I think this passage illustrates Luban's tendency to engage in state-bash· 
ing whenever the split-level standard runs into a jam. Casting the state as "the Great Satan," cf. 
p. 225, is not an adequate substitute for argument. 
15. Luban elsewhere suggests that rape cases belong in the civil suit paradigm. Seep. 151. 
He argues that therefore a defense lawyer is constrained from using the full range of zealous 
tactics to impeach the victim's testimony; but he does not go so far as to suggest that the rape 
defendant ought not to enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney/client priv-
ilege. My example does not depend, I think, on the nature of the offense; aggravated assault of 
one male upon another would present the same essential features. 
16. Letter from David Luban to William A. Edmundson (Sept. 21, 1989) (on file with 
author). 
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undercuts the possibility of founding the civil/criminal distinction 
upon the threat that criminal prosecution uniquely presents to physi-
cal liberty: 
To be sure, physical liberty is of great importance to us; but so are other 
things. We should not forget that the loss of physical liberty can be 
slight as well as great; when it is slight, other things can outweigh it .... 
I would rather do thirty days in jail than be fined twenty thousand dol-
lars .... Wouldn't you?17 
Given this, Luban cannot maintain that the rapist's temptation to per-
jure himself at his criminal trial is inherently greater than that in the 
battery suit he will have to defend later. Moreover, what can Luban 
say to any civil litigant who stands to lose $20,000 and wants to have 
the same zealous advocacy she could have in a criminal proceeding? 
The nonexistence of a civil privilege against self-immolation, 18 and 
the fact that few would be willing to plump for the creation of one, 
does represent a sharp discontinuity between our relative levels of so-
licitude for those having reason to be anxious about criminal liability 
and all others. Perhaps this discontinuity reveals deeper pressures 
that, if identified, would make compelling the idea of a lesser duty of 
confidentiality in civil cases. But there is no such sharp discontinuity 
in our levels of concern in the Spaulding 19 (civil) and "Lake Pleasant 
Bodies"20 (criminal) cases. 
Endorsing the lawyers' failure to disclose the whereabouts of the 
murder victims in the Lake Pleasant case is not made easier by the fact 
the client faces prosecution - it is made easier by the fact that the 
client has a lot to lose. Independently, the fact that the client's oppo-
nent is the state (rather than a private prosecutor, as in Annesley)21 
seems to count for very little. The lawyer's nondisclosure in Spaulding 
v. Zimmerman might be less troubling if it were a criminal negligence 
prosecution;22 but not by much if in the civil version the client were 
17. P. 262. Here, it is impossible not to be reminded of the well-traveled quip about the 
number of zeros that need to be put to the left of the decimal to make an example compelling to a 
legal audience. 
18. "Nonsurvival" might be more apt. At common law, "a party could claim a privilege of 
not being called to testify in behalf of an adversary (on the ground that it might be self-incrimina-
tory or expose the witness to disgrace)." c. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.2, at 243 
(1986) (emphasis added). 
19. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962); see supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. 
20. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), affd., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 
N.Y.S.2d 771, ajfd., 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976); see supra note 4 
and accompanying text. 
21. Craig v. Anglesey, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743); see supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. , 
22. Of course, Spaulding presents a host of possible criminal law counterparts. Suppose, for 
example, that jeopardy has attached, and that therefore nothing the lawyer discloses can affect 
the client's criminal exposure. Or suppose that jeopardy has not attached, that the complainant's 
discovery of the aneurysm would probably lead to the filing of more serious charges, and that the 
aneurysm is unlikely to burst before jeopardy attaches, but is almost certain to burst when the 
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without fault, uninsured, and exposed to the full extent of his assets. 
And nondisclosure in the criminal version would not be any less 
troubling if it were a prosecution for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Shifting from one field of law to another confronts us with an 
altered array of consequences, but not a sharp discontinuity in our 
responses. And our responses do not seem to register the relative 
power of the players to anything like the degree we would expect if 
civil and criminal paradigms mattered the way Luban would have 
them. 
Luban's discussion in Part II includes a more surefooted - and, I 
think, devastating - critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in 
Upjohn v. United States, 23 which upheld an evidentiary privilege for 
corporate attorney-client confidences (pp. 220-33). In this Part, 
Luban also advances a vigorous (if problematic) defense of the view 
that the duty of confidentiality does not require criminal defense law-
yers to conceal client perjury (pp. 197-201). Although this position is 
widely held, it does not seem to square with Luban's earlier appeal to a 
dimensionless "prophylactic overprotection" of the accused criminal 
at the expense of truth. 
Apart from the structural weaknesses in Luban's argument in 
Parts I and II, there are difficulties inherent in the programmatic re-
forms he proposes. Luban argues that the current codes of legal ethics 
have things reversed (pp. 159-60). Under current codes, the lawyer is 
free to ignore the client's wishes with respect to tactical matters, but 
must yield to the client's contrary wishes with respect to the client's 
ultimate aims and means of achieving them, or resign if she can.24 
Luban argues that respect for the client's human dignity requires that 
the client call the tactical shots, while the lawyer's accountability on 
the moral activist model requires her to insist on her view of what the 
client should want and how the client may get it. 
Luban acknowledges that current professional standards, as com-
complainant undergoes the stress of trial (including the brutal cross-examination you have 
planned). Or suppose the same facts, but that the aneurysm is likely to burst before jeopardy 
attaches, that that in itself will cause manslaughter charges to be filed, but the client will not 
consent to disclosure. In each of these instances one might inquire, in the manner of casebook 
authors, what result? 
23. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1982). 
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OP 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 7-7, EC 7-8 (1980). As many commenta-
tors have noted, there are difficulties inherent in any attempt to divide the respective spheres of 
client and lawyer control by appeal to dichotomies such as "tactics/ends" or "means/objec-
tives." See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 156. "Reversing" spheres of authority so 
questionably defined, as Luban does, is unlikely to be ultimately satisfactory. It is distressing 
that, in practice, the degree of authority assumed by the lawyer seems inversely related to the 
client's ability to pay. Compare J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) with D. ROSENTHAL, ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN 
CHARGE? (1974). 
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monly interpreted, permit a lawyer to seek to withdraw from a mor-
ally repugnant representation even at a cost to the client.25 Luban 
takes this as exhibiting the current professional standards' endorse-
ment of the standard conception. But it is unclear what alternative 
(besides acquiescence and withdrawal) a move to the moral activist 
ethic would open. Luban floats the suggestion that "the rules be re-
drafted to allow lawyers to forgo immoral tactics or the pursuit of 
unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their clients insist that they 
use these tactics or pursue these ends" (p. 159; emphasis added). It is 
difficult to envisage how a lawyer might convey such a decision to the 
client (as surely she must) other than in terms that would naturally be 
understood either as a threat to withdraw or as a threat to act - as 
the client's attorney - in a manner contrary to the client's announced 
wishes. The former sort of threat is already allowed under current 
professional standards. The latter is apt to seem presumptuous (and 
even preposterous) unless the lawyer can support it by appeal to some 
law or mandatory ethical standard. Luban expressly declines to de-
cide whether to endorse a mandatory or an aspirational standard of 
forgoing immoral tactics (and, presumably, of eschewing immoral 
ends), and therefore the reform proposal he does offer seems shapeless 
(see p. 158). 
The other end of Luban's proposed reversal is problematic as well. 
Because the question whether to forgo "nonfrivolous [but moral] legal 
positions" is, for Luban, a tactical one; it is one that the client must 
make (p. 160). Presumably, it is the lawyer's duty to inform the client 
that such positions exist, for this is surely entailed, on Luban's view, 
by the necessity of respecting the client's human dignity. It is not 
clear, however, how this transfer of tactical authority to the client 
could fail to hinder the efficiency of the justice system and to curtail 
the lawyer's capacity to negotiate, mediate, and compromise - to say 
nothing of the impact such a transfer would have upon the quality of 
professional existence. 26 
Another weakness in Luban's generally astute discussion pertains 
to the issue of the moral complications of representing unworthy cli-
ents in order to vindicate not the client's interests but an abstract prin-
ciple. The ACLU's advocacy of the Nazis' right to demonstrate in 
predominantly Jewish Skokie, Illinois, is defended by Luban by ap-
pealing to the doctrine of "double effect" - according to which "it is 
25. See pp. 396-97 & n.2; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.16(b) (1983); 
MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2), DR 7-10l(A)(3) (1980). 
26. Luban elsewhere notes a corporate lawyer's description of his work as "picking fly shit 
out of the pepper." P. 401. Each movement of the tweezers arguably would represent a tactical 
decision to pursue or forgo a nonfrivolous legal position ("this is relevant, this is privileged, this 
is work product, this is outside the scope of their request," etc.). Those who have actually done 
this sort of thing will appreciate how irksome it would be truly to involve an unsophisticated 
client in each of these decisions. 
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permissible to perform an act likely to have evil indirect consequences 
... only if its direct effect ... is morally acceptable and the intention 
of the actor aims only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect not being 
one of her ends" (p. 162). Luban suggests that the doctrine "fits" the 
ACLU position and "more generally, any lawyer who represents scum 
to vindicate principles" (p. 162). So long as we can "hang onto" the 
doctrine, Luban says, the ACLU lawyer can be defended without ap-
peal to the principle of nonaccountability, and thus without undercut-
ting the attack on the standard conception. 27 
But presumably the "double effect" excuse is not one that Luban 
wants to be made generally available, for it would excuse much of the 
lawyerly conduct that he wants to condemn. Lord Anglesey's lawyer 
does not seek James Annesley's destruction; he rather seeks, by fore-
stalling Annesley's claim, to protect his client's property - so de-
scribed, a morally acceptable end and one more directly furthered 
than that of Annesley's destruction. Although certainly Luban would 
object to such an application of the doctrine of double effect, it is un-
clear how he can consistently do so while relying upon the "double 
effect" doctrine to reconcile the moral accountability of criminal de-
fense lawyers with their violation of the common moral duty not to 
"get[] a guilty, violent criminal back out on the street."28 
A final source of unease with Parts I and II of the book has to do 
with the treatment of examples. Those intended to illustrate lawyers 
at odds with common morality happen preponderantly to be drawn 
from the criminal defense paradigm, and under general application of 
Luban's split-level approach the common moral obligation involved 
would still be ignored. Because of the state's special role as protector 
of the young, Luban presumably would place the child-custody case in 
the civil rather than the quasi-criminal paradigm, and therefore the 
lawyer may not zealously advocate the incestuous parent's cause (p. 
65). This, and Luban's suggestion that rape cases belong in the civil 
paradigm,29 indicates that the civil/criminal/quasi-criminal frame-
work is not self-defining. Although the framework is not so devoid of 
content as to be totally ad hoc, there are indications aplenty that it is 
no substitute for analysis. William Simon proposes an approach that 
would have the lawyer measure her ethical responses to the likelihood 
that other actors in the legal system will correct wrongs that her zeal-
27. P. 162. Luban's image of "hanging on to" the doctrine of double effect is apt. Philippa 
Foot has cogently argued that the examples from which the doctrine draws what plausibility it 
has can be handled as well - or better - by distinguishing positive duties (to render aid) from 
negative duties (to avoid harming). See P. FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19-32 (1978). 
28. P. xx. Luban concedes that even in the criminal paradigm the principle of nonac-
countability "holds only approximately" because "powerful countervailing reasons will apply in 
some instances." P. 156 n.6. What these reasons are and when and how they might prevail is 
not even suggested. 
29. See supra note 15. 
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ous conduct might cause. 30 Such an approach dispenses altogether 
with Luban's categories, and has much to recommend it. 
In the clearly civil instances, the lawyer's conduct on the moral 
activist model would be tempered, but Luban seems insufficiently con-
cerned with showing that common morality would in fact be violated 
by what the standard conception would have the lawyer do. In the 
Zabel/a 31 case, for example, it is not obvious that a moral obligation to 
repay a monetary debt does not tend to decay with the "mere efllux of 
time" (p. 10) - for time never merely passes: expectations change, 
debtors come to rely on their creditors' forbearance, and so forth. 
Common morality is not as monolithic or as straightforward as Luban 
frequently suggests; nor does it exist in airtight isolation from law.32 
Especially where what morality requires is unclear, law's alembic fre-
quently serves to distill its content. Therefore, some care needs to be 
taken to distinguish our unhappiness with the ethics of laws from our 
unhappiness with the ethics of lawyers. 
Also troubling is the fact that none of Luban's abstract discussion 
furthers an understanding of some of the "lawyers against the law" 
examples. Luban never explains why forum-shopping and taking in-
consistent positions are inherently disrespectful of the law. And 
Luban never explains how a professional duty to follow the spirit of 
the law can stand, without poljcing, as a more effective curb against 
lawyerly disrespect for law than the "good faith" requirement embod-
ied in current professional standards. 33 
Part III of the book (pp. 237-89) is devoted to establishing that the 
30. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988). I should note 
that Simon bites off considerably Jess than Luban, and that may be why he is able to chew 
without categorial assistance. Simon, for example, applies his analysis only to civil practice; 
although he suggests that it "has relevance" to criminal practice, its defense requires "qualifica-
tions and elaborations" that he has not yet put into print. See id. at 1084. Moreover, Simon's 
analysis does not apply to conflicts between "legal and nonlegal moral commitments." Id. at 
1114. A commitment is "legal" for Simon if it is "grounded in important legal values." Id. 
Although this is not clear from Simon's discussion, presumably his approach has no application 
to Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N. W.2d 704 (1962), for in the absence of con-
sent, or some special relationship, a positive duty to render aid does not appear to be grounded in 
any important legal value. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). There-
fore, the defense lawyer's dilemma in Spaulding is presumably defined by his legal commitment 
to keep the confidence and a merely moral commitment to render aid, and is a dilemma Simon's 
analysis is not intended to cover. 
31. Zabella v. Pake!, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957); see supra text accompanying note 3. 
32. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has pointed out that "law, rather than a mere technical 
add-on to a morally (or immorally) finished society, is, along of course with a whole range of 
other cultural realities from the symbolics of faith to the means of production, an active part of 
it." C. GEERTZ, LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
218 (1983). For another view of what Geertz might call the "imminglement" oflaw and moral-
ity, see Edmundson, Are Law and Morality Distinct?, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 33 (1990). 
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). Luban offers a 
spirited argument designed to show that a "good faith" standard is ineffectual in a world ruled by 
the standard conception. Pp. 16-17. 
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poor have a right to at least minimally competent legal assistance in 
civil as well as criminal matters. Luban argues that a right to civil 
counsel is implicit in the principles that legitimate our form of govern-
ment, and in doing so paradoxically argues that the Supreme Court, in 
refusing to extend the Gideon v. Wainwright 34 line of cases to civil 
matters, has overvalued the civil/criminal distinction (pp. 261-62). He 
advocates the deregulation of routine legal services and a mandatory 
pro bono requirement to guarantee the remainder. Although his dis-
cussion of deregulation seems insensitive to some of the difficulties of 
isolating what legal services are truly routine, empirical patterns of 
lawyer-to-layperson delegation are sufficient to show that the profes-
sion itself has reached a tacit consensus that certain legal services -
particularly in the real estate area - fall on the routine side of the 
line, however it is drawn. 
In what I think is the most powerful section of the book, Luban 
defends the concept of mandatory pro bono against a range of popular 
but specious objections (pp. 277-89). Luban's discussion on this point 
should be required reading for everyone seriously interested in the pro-
fession. In Part IV (pp. 293-391), he ably defends the concept of state-
funded morally activist representation against charges that it is an-
tidemocratic and a betrayal of the poor. My suspicion, though, is that 
decently funded, politically unhamstrung legal services programs will 
be a long time coming (back). 35 Mandatory pro bono and limited de-
regulation, on the other hand, are ideas whose time is already arriv-
ing. 36 As these ideas are implemented they may at least help to fill 
ordinary peoples' legal needs, which go unmet in staggering num-
bers. 37 The legal profession's indifference to these needs, much more 
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
35. See Under Bush, a Band of Reaganites Continues Fight to Slash Funds for Legal Aid to the 
Poor, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1989, at Al8, col. l; Lewis, Legal Services: Political Test Looms/or 
Bush, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at BS, col. 3; Internecine Battles at the Legal Services Corp. 
Continue Unabated, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1989, at B4, col. 6; Lewis, Bush Replaces Leadership of 
Legal Services/or Poor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at Al4, col. 1. 
36. See e.g., At Issue.· Mandatory Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 52; Margolick, Panel 
UrgesLawyersBeRequiredto Work20Hoursa Year for Poor, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1989,atAl, 
col. l; Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, Natl. L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1. 
Luban's proposal for mandatory pro bono includes a "buy out" option, see pp. 279-80, which 
would not only be economically desirable - since the price many lawyers are willing to pay to be 
excused from an hour of pro bono exceeds the value they could deliver in that hour - it would 
also make the plan politically more feasible. 
37. Luban calculates that more than 20 million hours of necessary legal services are not 
provided to the poor in the United States annually. P. 241. Even in the supposedly big-expo· 
sure/deep-pocket area of medical malpractice, one ABA committee's study found that only 
about one of every six instances of malpractice gives rise to a claim, much less a recovery. See 
also Malpractice Study Finds 7.000 Died in New York in 1984 Due to Negligence, Wall St. J., Mar. 
1, 1990, at B4, col. 6 ("Only 2% of the patients that suffered a negligent injury actually filed a 
claim .... ") Contrary to the popular myth that ours is an excessively litigious society, Ameri· 
cans are "slow to perceive injury . . . reluctant to make claims . . . and . • . fearful of • • • 
litigating." Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming ..• , 15 LAW. & Socv. REv. 631, 652 (1981); see also Galanter, Reading the 
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than its excesses of zeal in pursuing the interests it does serve, seems to 
me to epitomize the failure of lawyers to do justice. 
The virtue of mandatory pro bono lies not exclusively, or perhaps 
even primarily, in its direct distributive consequences. As has been 
pointed out, a powerful determinant of a lawyer's social attitudes is 
the nature of the interests she represents.38 To the extent that 
mandatory pro bono will compel lawyers to identify themselves with 
interests unlike their own and unlike those they typically represent, it 
will have the salutary effect of enabling them to regain something of 
the detachment and evenhandedness that were once thought specially 
to qualify lawyers to guide public policy.39 
As Luban points out, the massive concentrations of private wealth 
in America operate to defeat popularly desired distributive reforms 
(pp. 358-68). This reality is a complete answer to any suggestion that 
our concerns about justice in the distribution of legal services should 
be confined to taxing and spending legislation. Still, it is not evident, 
at first blush anyway, why reform is likely to fare any better in the 
ABA and the state bar associations than in the legislatures. One rea-
son to think that the profession may be better able to advance redis-
tributive reform is that the bar has for so long and so insistently 
espoused an ideal of public service, that mere consistency requires it to 
addre&s a condition it so deplores and is best able to correct.40 Also, so 
long as the maldistribution of legal services remains unaddressed, the 
autonomy of the profession (a matter of some concern to the organized 
bar) will to that extent be less secure. As to the question, "Why, and 
at what level, should the bar rather than the public at large fund costly 
redistributive measures?," one answer is that the monopoly rents the 
bar commands supply both a justification and a measure of what the 
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Alleg-
edly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983). To paraphrase a welfare-
rights lawyer Luban cites, the poor are "constantly bumping into sharp legal things" and not 
complaining- at least not to anyone prepared to represent them. P.241 (citing Wexler, Practic-
ing Law for Poor People, 19 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970)). 
38. See Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers from Their Profession: Rede.fining the Lawyer's 
Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32-34 (1980); see generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE (1957). 
39. See L. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313 (1913); 
Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City 
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 52 
(G. Gawalt ed. 1984); Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large 
Law Firms, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 95, 118. 
40. See, e.g., AssN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK SPECIAL COMM. ON THE 
LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS, TOWARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER (1979); cf. Professional Responsibility: Report of the 
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, i216 (1958); Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional 
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TExAs L. REV. 689, 697-701 (1981) (pointing out the 
ABA's "narcissistic concern" with promoting an image of public-spiritedness, and recounting the 
demise of the Kutak Commission's mandatory pro bono proposal). 
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bar should be expected to contribute.41 
Philip B. Heymann's and Lance Liebman's The Social Responsibil-
ities of Lawyers42 is as important a pedagogic contribution as Lawyers 
and Justice is a theoretical one. The authors have collected and 
loosely organized thirteen "case studies," which are self-consciously 
modeled upon materials used in schools of business and of public pol-
icy. The studies are intended to describe "events, institutions, choices, 
and outcomes" (p. xxi) with a richness of detail that stands in contrast 
to the skeletal and tendentious narration that typifies appellate opin-
ions, whose further skeletalized edited versions form the stuff of the 
standard law school casebook. The authors suggest that viewing the 
issues of professional responsibility through the prism of appellate de-
cisions obscures "what ... lawyers do, and how ... the profession [is] 
structured" and unduly highlights "'the law': rules, doctrines, poli-
cies'~ (p. xxi). The book is an effort to present the legal, social, and 
ethical issues that confront lawyers in a "credible context," and to 
avoid circumscribing that context in any way that might make ethical 
problems seem merely individual and occasional rather than as they 
are, common and systemic. 
The stories (this is as good a name as any for the narrative portions 
of the studies) average just under twenty pages in length, and so are 
much longer than the problems and hypotheticals found in most 
teaching materials.43 The stories focus on individual lawyers who, col-
lectively, well represent the vast diversity of the bar: legal services 
attorneys, public defenders, plaintiffs' workers' compensation lawyers, 
storefront legal clinicians, prosecutors, corporate lawyers, corporate 
41. Deborah Rhode has decried the "vacuous ring" of redistributivist rhetoric. See Rhode, 
The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Mo. L. REv. 274, 281-83 (1986). Any "meaningful 
effort to equalize access" would, given (among other things) the "elasticity of legal needs," re-
quire "massive public subsidies [and] the prohibition of private markets." Id. at 282. Moreover, 
"[m]ore modest calls to enhance, if not fully equalize, access still leave all the sticky points 
unaddressed." Id. Rhode's first (extreme) alternative is not so very different from the manner in 
which we pursue the ideal of equal political access: we massively subsidize government services 
and prohibit a market in votes. As to Rhode's point about the more modest calls, the sticky 
points no doubt have to be addressed, but there is no reason to think they are unaddressable. 
Rhode elsewhere has argued that a 40-hour-per-year mandatory pro bone requirement would not 
"materially affect a problem of such [perceived] dimensions." See Rhode, supra note 41, at 701. 
I think Rhode is too despairing. Three million, two hundred thousand hours of legal work per 
annum (40 hours times 800,000 lawyers) is better than the proverbial poke in the eye with a 
sharp stick; and these hours may have an impact far beyond what their numbers suggest if they 
are spent, as Luban urges (pp. 341-57), seeking class-wide remedies to the most urgent problems 
of the underrepresented. 
42. The authors are professors at Harvard Law School. 
43. Other authors have tried to include more extensive fact patterns than those typically 
excerpted from appellate opinions, but none have approached Heymann and Leibman in the 
degree of prolixity. Cf s. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAW AND ETHICS 356·60, 584-88, 613-15, 665-69, 728-32, 828-35 (2d ed. 1989) (seven "simu-
lated case histories,'' averaging about four pages each); N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH (2d ed. 1983) (17 problems, using narratives that average three 
pages). 
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litigators, mergers and acquisitions specialists, legislators, lobbyists for 
the personal injury bar, associates, elder statespersons, and so forth. 
Their educational backgrounds are stereotypically outstanding -
Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Georgetown - except where "credible con-
text" demands otherwise: e.g., a legal clinic associate is identified as a 
graduate of "!Iliana Law School" (p. 58). In the course of their sto-
ries, some of these lawyers serve a single client, or none at all; others 
deal with dozens or scores. In almost all of the stories, the lawyers are 
presented as dealing not with a single decision but with a network of 
decisions, and not as deciding in isolation, but in conjunction with 
clients, colleagues, supervisors, associates, professional acquaintances, 
and friends. Judges rarely appear, and when they do their role is the 
'perfunctory one of ratifying bargains struck elsewhere. 
Preserving "credible context" sometimes involves an eclecticism 
worthy of a bowerbird. In addition to narrative and - occasionally 
- excerpted statutes and ABA rules, many of the studies include such 
things as casts of characters, chronologies, historical sketches, appen-
dices, lists, breakdowns, statistics, tables, memoranda, drafts, and 
charts. The reader is drawn - much as the lawyer would be - into 
complex micro-worlds, and in the process learns a good deal about 
such things as caffeine, asbestos, and "blue sky" securities laws. The 
stories themselves elide nothing. Names forgettable - Jason Smith, 
Martha Solinger, Rosemary Pryor - brush against names well-known 
- Cesar Chavez, Joseph Flom, Gary Hart. In one of the cases, a 
certain Trevor King is introduced (p. 241). An accountant, his sole 
performance is to instruct that an audit be done and to report its re-
sults to higher-ups. Such devices may sound annoying, as occasionally 
they are, but they are also surprisingly effective in conveying some-
thing of the flavor of practice; and, particularly in the first-person nar-
ratives, they make the stories more compelling reading. 
The stories have various sources. Some are based upon events re-
ported in appellate opinions; others give us a fuller account of events 
that were contemporaneously publicized - the volte-face of the Jus-
tice Department in the Bob Jones University 44 case (pp. 136-82); the 
battle to acquire Conoco (pp. 106-35); the OPM Leasing Services scan-
dal (pp. 184-215); the defeat of the Hart-Magnuson federal "no-fault" 
automobile insurance bill (pp. 309-35). Other stories are based upon 
events that would be anonymous even apart from the authors' use of 
fictitious names: "Gladys' " struggle for custody of her grand-
daughter, "Rita" (pp. 2-20); "David Keith's" defense against murder 
charges (pp. 69-105); an unnamed woman's settlement of her workers' 
compensation claim (pp. 258-94). Research and drafts of the stories 
were done by a squad of student research assistants. One of the stories 
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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is, in fact, a business school case study.45 
As a concession to the traditional casebook format, each study is 
followed (one is interrupted) by rhetorical questions and a modicum of 
discussion. Often the questions and discussion identify issues pertain-
ing to the Code and Model Rules, but not all of the technical issues 
present in the cases are identified. The first story, for example, "Rita's 
Case," so involves Gladys' lawyer with the everyday lives of Gladys 
and Rita that she becomes privy to unprivileged knowledge unhelpful 
to Gladys. The authors' discussion questions the propriety of her in-
volvement, but it does not flag the potential applicability of the "law-
yer/witness" rule.46 
Another example: in "Food for Thought" (pp. 216-34), an associ-
ate drafts a memorandum for a client whose powdered chocolate milk 
mix contains an ingredient, caffeine, that is not listed on its label. She 
concludes that the omission is a violation of law but, at the end of a 
meeting with her supervising partner and the client corporation's pres-
ident, she is directed to produce an opinion letter taking the opposite 
position. After the meeting breaks up the lawyer leaves the office to 
keep a lunch date with a friend, who she hopes can help her sort 
through her dilemma. The discussion and questions following the 
story raise a number of issues, including whether the lawyer may or 
must go to the Food and Drug Administration to blow the whistle on 
the client - but they do not raise the issue of the lawyer's duty or 
permission to approach the client's board of directors, 47 nor do they 
question the propriety of her seeking her friend's guidance.48 
These oversights (if that is what they are) may in fact be pedagogi-
cally useful. First, they are an almost unavoidable product of the 
wealth of detail and ambiguous shading that the authors have tried to 
build into the stories. Second, the latency of so many issues conveys 
(whether or not by indirection) the fact that practice is saturated with 
ethical significance at every level of choice - whether the decision is 
as momentous as choosing, say, between working for a blue-chip firm 
and working for the Environmental Protection Agency, or as mun-
dane as choosing what social distance (if any) to keep between oneself 
and a client. 
Many of the discussions - for example, that of the OPM Leasing 
story (pp. 184-97)- focus with considerable penetration upon techni-
cal issues of how to apply the Code or Model Rules. The studies also 
45. Pp. 49-68 ("The Law Offices of Lewin and Associates"). 
46. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-lOl(B), 5-102 (1980); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983). 
47. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980); MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.13 (b) (1983). 
48. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). 
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raise a fair cross-section of the standard "hard" questions: impeaching 
the truthful witness, telling the client how likely arguably illegal future 
conduct is to be detected, and so on. One of the chief virtues of both 
the stories and the discussions, however, is that the authors have kept 
their aim upon the issues of how best to lead one's life, how best to 
serve others (including one's clients), and how best to serve justice, 
rather than upon the often merely prudential, technical questions of 
how to avoid discipline and liability. In the discussion of "Rita's 
Case" the authors brilliantly pose and explore the issues of client au-
tonomy, and of the propriety of zealous devotion to the client's inter-
ests where a genuine adversarial contest is not to occur (see pp. 2-20). 
Allotting equal time in the discussion to every conceivable technical 
issue would, I think, have conveyed the message that no distinction 
need be made between large and small considerations. Ethical con-
cern is like every other resource, scarce; and so to the extent that one 
is trained to attend to technical propriety, one is trained to ignore 
larger questions. 
Many of the stories end with an epilogue following the discussion 
questions. The epilogues typically add yet another level of ambiguity 
- even irony - to what has come before. Admirably, none of the 
epilogues provide any sort of resolution or Aristotelian unity. Gladys 
gets custody of Rita, who continues to have difficulties; Gladys' lawyer 
loses contact with them. Further epidemiological studies make the 
hazards of caffeine less certain, which affects in subtle ways the legal-
ity of failing to list it as an ingredient. The "once-in-a-lifetime" thrill 
of thwarting Seagram's bid for Conoco settles into memory as Conoco 
is swallowed by DuPont. Life goes on; and the crisp, zero-sum de-
nouement that appellate decisions lead us to expect simply never 
comes. 
While Luban typifies the quest for a meta-principle to palliate the 
excesses of adversary ethics, Heymann and Liebman suggest a more 
nominalistic approach to the entire subject, an approach that has affin-
ities to recent trends in philosophy and legal scholarship. It has be-
come almost a commonplace to observe that ethics arise in and draw 
substance from some shared form of life, some community of purpose 
and meaning, some group ethos, tradition, or Lebenswelt - and not 
from mere nature, or from reason itself, or from any supernatural stip-
ulation. 49 Philosopher Bernard Williams, for example, has argued 
that ethical knowledge can exist only within a matrix of "thick de-
scription," by which he means an evaluative discourse that partakes of 
the richness and particularity of routine factual description. 50 Thick 
49. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY (1977); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE (1981); J. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977). 
50. See B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 128-30, 142-50, 167-73 
(1985). 
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description employs "thick concepts," such as coward, lie, brutality, 
and gratitude. Such concepts are "world-guided," in that they possess 
an ineliminable descriptive content, and are at the same time inher-
ently "action guiding," in that their application supplies reasons for 
action. 
Ethical knowledge, Williams argues, is born of particularity and 
dies of abstraction. We are drawn to abstraction because of our desire 
to make one thing of many, and to make what is local universal. But 
in abstracting we tear ethics loose from the only soil in which it can 
grow. Williams concludes that ethical knowledge is lost if reflection 
upon cross-cultural differences draws local discourse into a universal-
istic ethical vocabulary.51 If Williams is right, then Luban's project, of 
reconciling distinctively professional "trade idioms" (pp. 4, 104) with 
a presumably universalistic "commonsense" morality, must fail. 52 But 
even if this project fails, the trade idioms of the law may very well 
support ethical knowledge. If the trade idioms of legal practice pos-
sess the descriptive richness of thick concepts, then legal ethical 
knowledge is possible - perhaps even codifiable. 
Whether or not this is right, it suggests precisely the approach 
Heymann, Liebman, and associates have taken. The stories show us 
the soil, and they illustrate how ethical worries typically enter con-
sciousness not via "rules, doctrines, policies" but because something 
"out there" in the world strikes us as fishy, out-of-whack, or because 
we catch ourselves rationalizing a choice a second or third time. In 
the Conoco takeover story, a first-year associate finds a legal theory to 
delay the advances of a hostile "suitor." "It was sort of a bizarre 
claim ... ," she muses after the fact (p. 112). As to another, similarly 
tenuous claim, she feels "vindicated about it everyday," because the 
suitor later went broke (p. 113). The capacity to respond in this way 
to a situation - apart from any aptitude for "issue spotting'' or rule-
mongering - is the equipment by which much of ethical life is led. 
But ethical knowledge requires more than happy intuition. On 
Williams' view, meaningful legal ethical discourse presupposes a 
quasi-descriptive vocabulary: e.g., this tactic was "lawyerly," this con-
51. According to Williams, if one prizes knowledge but has no confidence in reflection as a 
means to it, "the idea that reflection can destroy knowledge will tum against reflection and 
express itself in the kind of conservatism, or worse, that praises rootedness, unspoken grasp, and 
traditional understandings." Id. at 168. Williams adds that "(t]here is certainly more to be said 
for these things than much progressive thought has allowed ...• " Id. For an encomium to 
"unspoken grasp," see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). 
52. In Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra 
note 6, at 259, Williams warns against casting the divergence of professional and common moral-
ity as a matter of casuistical, rather than dispositional, conflict. Id. at 263. From the latter 
perspective, the important problem is one of avoiding "a mystifying conception of the dignity of 
the profession," id. at 266, which Williams suggests is to be solved by cultivating professional 
dispositions that incorporate a psychologically sustainable degree of reflectiveness. Williams had 
no occasion, in this essay, to address the issue of what might be an epistemologically sustainable 
degree of professional reflectiveness. 
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tact was "unprofessional," that disclosure was "unethical." Yet the 
Heymann and Liebman book unsettles any such presupposition. In 
story after story, conduct that is permissible (if at all) only at the mar-
gins of the professional role as defined by the Code and Rules, is repre-
sented as an integral and even central part of lawyers' work. The 
public defender: "To represent a client properly, you have to be able 
to develop an enormous amount of empathy . . . . If the jury se:qses 
that you· do not like your client, that you just do not care if he goes 
down the drain, sure as anything they will flush him."53 Litigators for 
Conoco: "People who run companies [facing hostile takeover bids] 
will pay anything to anyone who can give them hope .... [A]nything 
with even the most remote chance of success is done . . . . [It] is not a 
game of high percentage arguments . . . . You can't bring frivolous 
lawsuits, but .... "54 Dissonance abounds: a plaintiffs' workers' com-
pensation lawyer deplores lawyer advertising, but spends tens of 
thousands of dollars for it annually: "[I]f they are going to allow it, 
then I'm going to do more than anybody else. But I think it is terrible 
to have" (p. 270). 
The restoration of "credible context" facilitates the study of legal 
ethics from other perspectives. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has in-
sisted that an understanding of legal practices is possible only to the 
extent that we resist the urge to "draw pure structure from its culture-
specific accretions."55 This perspective calls into question the assump-
tion of homogenized membership, which has been thought to be a de-
fining feature of the professions. 56 Although the passing of what may 
have once been a more nearly homogenous and monolithic bar has 
been widely noted, 57 this is a fact that legal education is supposed to 
mitigate, and for that reason, tends to deny. 
The chief virtue of the Heymann and Liebman book is that it pro-
vides credible descriptions of the various cultures that make up the 
American legal profession. Here, in the story of the lobbying of Con-
gress during long-running debates over federal no-fault automobile in-
53. P. 79; cf MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-17, 7-24, DR 7-
106(C)(4) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1983); Morris v. 
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1983) (holding that a criminal defendant has no sixth amendment 
right to a lawyer with whom she has good rapport). 
54. Pp. 112, 122; cf FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 
DR 7-102(A)(l),(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.4, 4.4 
(1983). 
55. c. GEERTZ, supra note 32, at 182 (quoting M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 33 
(1968)). 
56. See E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 3-13 (1957); M. LAR-
SON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 12-15 (1977). 
57. See Berle, Legal Professi'on and Legal Education, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 340-45 (E. Seligman & A. Johnson eds. 1933). The rapidly growing heterogeneity of 
the rapidly growing bar is a recurring theme of Richard Abel's recent study, R. ABEL, AMERI-
CAN LAWYERS (1989). 
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surance legislation, we find the very survival of one settled faction of 
the bar threatened by the activity of others. 58 The stories also illus-
trate how lawyers' roles overlap with nonlawyer roles: social worker, 
business person, psychologist, friend, comrade, lobbyist, and so on. 
This, and the diversity of roles within the profession, raise the question 
whether the effort to impose a univocal and usefully determinate 
"ethic" on the nearly 800,000 lawyers in the United States (double the 
number in 1970) can proceed from any assumed underlying trade id-
iom. Cumulatively, the stories suggest that Williams' "thick descrip-
tions" are absent, and that the pursuit of a unique and universal 
professional ethic presents a task of "compass[ing] dissensus,"59 in 
Geertz' phrase - rather than of distilling an essence. 
There has been a "call to context" in recent American legal schol-
arship60 and, in consequence, "[e]veryone has been writing stories 
these days."61 Recent writing on the narrative dimension of law has 
emphasized the possibilities of storytelling to.advance "outsider juris-
prudence."62 These accounts tend to assume that because lawyers oc-
cupy a privileged relationship to law, lawyers' stories are reflected in, 
and dominate, the law itself. 63 But, as the stories collected by Hey-
mann and Liebman show, legal materials - opinions, casebooks, and 
so forth - do a very poor job of presenting the stories that lawyers 
have to tell. The lawyer's voice is one among "the multiplicity of 
voices that the law generally quiets."64 The prime reason for this is 
that lawyers present themselves as tellers not of their own stories, but 
of stories composed to further what is thought to be the best outcome 
for their clients. Some of the best stories in this collection are those 
58. Pp. 317-20, 326. A similar point can be drawn from Luban's account of"A Shoot-out in 
the ABA" (pp. 180-85) over the Kutak Commission's proposed confidentiality rule. The most 
conspicuous faction in both struggles was the trial lawyers. See also R. ABEL, supra note 57, at 
11 (noting the growth of "unofficial professional associations divided by race, gender, religion, 
age, politics, clientele, function, and role"). There is no peace even within specialties not divided 
along plaintiffs' bar/defense bar lines. See, e.g., Matrimonial Lawyers Trade Barbs at Annual 
Convention in Chicago, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1989, at BS, col. 1. 
59. C. GEERTZ, supra note 32, at 219. It is no coincidence that "the soul-searching visible in 
the constant writing and rewriting of ethical rules" comes at a time when "[t]he increasing heter-
ogeneity of the profession and differentiation of the roles lawyers perform and the structures 
within which they practice have greatly complicated their efforts to engage in collective action." 
R. ABEL, supra note 57, at 5, 13. Williams suggests that following special rules is a worthwhile 
professional disposition, so long as the rules "are acknowledged to be conventions that can be 
changed by agreement." Williams, supra note 52, at 267. 
60. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 
87 MICH L. REv. 2099, 2099 (1989). See generally Legal Storytelling Symposium, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2073 (1989). 
61. Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. 
L. REv. 2411, 2411 (1989). 
62. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech.• Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2320, 2323-26 (1989). 
63. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2083-84 (1989) 
64. Id. at 2084. 
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that are told in the first person - particularly Randy Bellows' account 
of life as a public defender (pp. 69-105) - or are suffused with the 
personality of an individual lawyer - such as the account of Raul 
Lovett, the kitsch-encrusted, Mickey Mouse-loving plaintiffs' workers' 
compensation lawyer in Providence, Rhode Island (pp. 258-94). 
Narrative "may evoke our empathic distress response more readily 
than abstract theory."65 And while questions of entitlement cannot be 
decided on the basis of empathy alone, the personal decision - what 
sort of life shall I lead - is not simply a matter of deciding what sort 
of life has the strongest claim to be led; therefore, imaginatively gaug-
ing one's "empathic distress response" to a legal practice or lifestyle 
may indeed be the best single - if not the only - basis upon which to 
make such a choice. The Heymann and Liebman book may be most 
useful to those trying to decide whether to pursue a legal career or 
where within the variegated profession to try to fit themselves. The 
stories faithfully convey, without bathos, many of the stresses inherent 
in lawyers' roles. The unrelenting challenge of making a practice suc-
ceed as a business is squarely conveyed in "The Law Offices of Lewin 
& Associates" - the one true B-school study (pp. 49-68). The uneven 
course of what Luban would call "political love" between California 
Rural Legal Assistance lawyers and their Chicano clients is the main 
theme of the story that recounts a battle in the legal war for migrant 
farmworker rights. Randy Bellows' story of his defense of a confessed 
serial murderer begins: "This is the story of David Keith and a mar-
riage that was almost broken" (p. 69). Although the marriage he 
speaks of is, of course, his own, it somehow seems less vivid to the 
teller than the career that threatens it - which (perhaps inadver-
tently) reveals the root of the problem. 
Bellows' and other stories portray how lawyers often must learn to 
manage a gnawing sense of living in bad faith; Bellows, for example, 
tries "not to think about victims too much . . . . It makes a difficult job 
nearly impossible. . . . Occasionally . . . it does become impossi-
ble .... " (p. 79-80). He then recounts a case he pulled out of "[a]t the 
first opportunity" (p. 80). Without romanticizing either, the stories 
convey a sense of the rewards of practice as well as its burd,eqs. The 
happiest lawyers are those like Raul Lovett, who can choose and have 
chosen a style of practice that is close to their principles and personali-
ties. The lawyers who seem least at ease are those who sense that their 
professional roles leave something out of account, whether at the level 
of principle, personal bent, or both. Small concessions to individuality 
sometimes have to stretch a long way: the first-year associate caught 
up in the Conoco takeover fight works until midnight over the Fourth 
of July weekend, but "g[ets] to wear jeans" while doing so (p. 120). 
Although the virtue of the book lies, in a sense, in its excesses, not 
65. Massaro, supra note 60, at 2105. 
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all of its excesses are to the purpose. The OPM Leasing scandal story 
(pp. 184-97) is repeatedly interrupted by discussion questions. The 
questions are just fine as far as they go, but their interjection needlessly 
takes away from the reader the edifying task of discerning where in the 
course of events these very questions arise. The discussion questions 
are evidently intended to send the reader to an appendix (pp. 198-215), 
which purports to summarize the rules governing professional respon-
sibility. In fact, the section consists mostly of excerpts from the Code, 
the Model Rules, and Model Rules discussion drafts pertaining to con-
fidences and withdrawal. If intended for law students, this section 
needlessly duplicates material that is more usefully collected in the 
rules supplements that students will have bought anyway. If intended 
for prospective law students, the section is both opaque and mislead-
ingly incomplete in its omission, for example, of the Model Rules pro-
visions requiring candor toward the tribunal. 66 
Although not to diminish the importance of what Heymann and 
Liebman have done, I will mention a few more misgivings. I would 
have been interested to see more stories and fewer or none of the stock 
discussion questions. None of the stories included conveys, for exam-
ple, what it is like to be in-house corporate counsel and to face the 
ethical dilemmas peculiarly faced by them. 67 The special professional 
obstacles facing minorities, women, and parents are not highlighted in 
any of the stories. Heymann and Liebman embark in the spirit of re-
storing "credible context," but the pesky casebook rhetoricals that 
make up the discussion sections are as tendentious and skeletonizing 
in their way as the traditional sources the authors have eschewed. Not 
only does this sort of discussion undermine the verisimilitude the au-
thors have striven to attain, its presence encourages students to expect 
their ethical ways in the world to be signposted for them. Subsequent 
editions of the book, I venture to hope, will carry the editors' worthy 
insights all the way through. 
Each of the books reviewed here seeks to bring us closer to reality 
than the "miles away from life"68 to which Llewellyn found appellate 
opinions - and the casebooks they populate - to be removed. 
66. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983). 
67. For example, corporations often retain outside counsel to handle novel and interesting 
matters, presumably with the advice and concurrence of in-house counsel. At the same time, the 
corporate attorney-client privilege creates incentives to "launder" routine corporate decisions 
through counsel, simply to prepare barriers to discovery when litigation (almost inevitably) 
arises. There is a price in terms of monotony and diminished prestige that must be paid by in-
house counsel for their relatively more secure and predictable practices. But the security of in-
house practice may be largely illusory if, as it appears, professional standards forbid attorneys 
from negotiating contracts that limit their employers' right to discharge them "at will." See 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3) (1983) and Comment; MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1980); Herbster v. North Am. Co. 
for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 545, 
508 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 (1987). 
68. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 38 (1951). 
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Luban's insistence on the facts of pervasive economic inequality un-
seats the comfortable assumption that legal ethics exist in isolation 
from issues of distributive justice. Heymann and Liebman insist on 
the factual richness of practice contexts, and in so doing they counter-
act the tendency to approach legal ethics as a subject amenable to 
merely technical responses. In the epochal reexamination of our legal 
culture that is now well under way, these books are destined to have a 
marked impact upon the teaching, practice a11d ethics of law. 
